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ABSTRACT. The 1978 Yukon Territorial election was the first to be contested by all three territorial political parties. The Yukon
Territorial Progressive Conservative Party, which won the election, quickly demanded constitutional change, and received a
positive response from the federal Progressive Conservative government in 1979. The Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs,
Jake Epp, acceded to the Yukon Government’s request and issued a letter of instruction to the federally appointed Commissioner,
Ione Christensen. He ordered her to divest herself of her portfolio responsibilities and not participate in executive decision making.
Mrs. Christensen immediately resigned, stating that she did not want the role of a de facto Lieutenant Governor. Her resignation
triggered a debate in the Yukon legislature and the media over whether the Territory was moving “too far, too fast” toward
provincial status. Academics and politicians have also debated whether the changes effected by the “Epp letter” were significant
and irreversible, or merely a “sop” to assuage local sentiments. The anomaly of the Yukon’s constitutional status in Canada is
raised as a consequence of this debate.
Key words: commissioner, constitution, directive, executive, federal, government, instructions, legislative assembly, media,
minister, territory, Yukon
RÉSUMÉ. L’élection de 1978 dans le Territoire du Yukon a été la première à faire l’objet d’une contestation par les trois partis
politiques du Territoire. Le parti Progressiste-Conservateur du Yukon, qui avait remporté l’élection, ne tarda pas à réclamer un
changement constitutionnel et, en 1979, reçut une réponse positive du gouvernement fédéral Progressiste-Conservateur. Jake Epp,
ministre des Affaires indiennes et du Nord canadien, accéda à la demande du gouvernement du Yukon et fit parvenir au
Commissaire nommé par le fédéral, Ione Christensen, une lettre de directives. Il lui ordonnait de se défaire des responsabilités
rattachées à son portefeuille et de ne pas participer aux prises de décision administratives. Madame Christensen démissionna
immédiatement de son poste, déclarant qu’elle ne voulait pas d’un rôle de lieutenant-gouverneur de fait. Sa démission déclencha
un débat à l’assemblée législative du Yukon et dans les médias sur le fait que le Territoire allait «trop tôt et trop vite» vers un statut
de province. Les universitaires et les politiciens ont aussi débattu de l’importance et de l’irréversibilité réelles des changements
amenés par la fameuse «lettre Epp» ou du fait qu’elle était tout simplement un énoncé de principes visant à calmer les esprits de
la région. On soulève la question de l’anomalie du statut constitutionnel du Yukon au sein du Canada qui découle de ce débat.
Mots clés: commissaire, constitution, directives, administratif, fédéral, gouvernement, instructions, assemblée législative,
médias, ministre, territoire, Yukon
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INTRODUCTION
The 1970s were years of tremendous growth and change,
political, economic, and constitutional, in the Circumpolar
North. In Alaska, aboriginal land claims were settled and
the Alaska pipeline was constructed, bringing financial
independence to the state and a new era in aboriginal
affairs. In Greenland, the people’s struggle for constitu-
tional change culminated in the granting of Home Rule in
1979. And the Inuit Circumpolar Conference was organ-
ized to promote Inuit interests internationally.
In the Canadian North, land claims were launched in the
Yukon and Northwest Territories, and a settlement was
quickly reached in northern Quebec in 1975 (The James
Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement; see Morse,
1989:656). The Mackenzie Valley Pipeline Inquiry and the
Alaska Highway Pipeline Inquiry provided new opportuni-
ties for northern and aboriginal Canadians to express their
concerns about development and, at the same time, fueled
hopes for new jobs and economic development in the North.
In the Yukon, territorial constitutional development
was a major political objective, and territorial politicians
made rapid gains in several arenas: they obtained addi-
tional seats on the Executive Committee (cabinet), organ-
ized territorial political parties and ran candidates in
territorial election campaigns. At least one federal party
leader, Joe Clark, affirmed their aspirations for provincial
status. In the land claims arena, the Council for Yukon
Indians had launched its land claim and made significant
progress at the negotiating table by 1978. Both aboriginal
and territorial leaders were jockeying for position with
federal authorities, and clashes were inevitable. Minister
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Faulkner described the situation succinctly in his letter of
instruction to Commissioner Christensen on 25 January
1979:
I should emphasize that the three major matters which
I have in mind—constitutional development, Indian
land claims, and economic development (including
pipelines)—all have a high degree of priority, and none
of them can be pursued…at the expense of one or more
of the others…The complexity of the linkages between
these priorities is illustrated by the current constitu-
tional situation in the Territory. The elected Territorial
Council has been pressing for further transfers of
authority…from the Federal Government. Yukon Indi-
ans, who have a direct relationship with the Federal
Government,…have at the same time been pressing for
greater authority...The requirement to reconcile the
spirit and objectives of the Yukon and Indian Acts, as
they relate to Government in the Yukon, poses a com-
plex political problem for the Federal Government, and
more particularly for me as the Minister responsible.
(Faulkner, 1979).
The Yukon’s Commissioner, a federal appointee, was
expected to be a leader, a mediator, and a messenger, in an
increasingly complex and hostile environment of party
politics and land claim negotiations.
BACKGROUND
The Yukon Territory was created on 13 June 1898 with
the passage of the Yukon Act (Yukon Act, [1898]). The Act
provided for the appointment of a commissioner to be the
chief executive officer of the territory and a council of up
to six persons to assist the commissioner. This council
became wholly elected in 1908, and was authorized to
enact ordinances for the governance of the territory. In
practice, the commissioner and his administration pre-
pared all budgets and legislation, which were then pre-
sented to the council for ratification.
 The Yukon Act requires the commissioner to administer
the government of the Yukon under instructions given by
the governor in council or the minister (Yukon Act, [1898]).
Letters of instruction have often been issued by Ministers
of Indian and Northern Affairs upon the appointment of a
new Commissioner to provide overall guidance in the
exercise of executive powers and, occasionally, to give
specific direction on issues, such as refusal of assent to
territorial legislation (Elliott, 1978; Smyth, 1988). Thus
letters of instruction in the territories are important consti-
tutional documents, which have no equivalent in the prov-
inces. Furthermore, because instructions are specifically
provided for in the Yukon Act, they may be considered a
form of subordinate legislation. Lieutenant governors in
the provinces, upon their appointment, are given overall
guidance in their work by the governor in council. These
instructions are pro forma documents, quite unlike the
detailed and often specific instructions given to a territo-
rial commissioner. Furthermore, instructions to lieutenant
governors are authorized by their commissions, while
instructions to commissioners are authorized by federal
statute (Elliott, 1978).
The Executive Committee
In the late 1960s, members of the Yukon legislature
vigorously lobbied the minister of Indian and Northern
Affairs to form an executive council that would include
elected members in the policy-making process. Minister
Chretien eventually acquiesced to the appointment of a
five-member executive committee (a proto-cabinet) con-
sisting of the commissioner, two deputy commissioners,
and two elected members. This committee was established
by Commissioner James Smith under the authority of a
letter of instruction issued on 17 June 1970 (Smyth, 1990).
The executive committee proved to be a valuable mecha-
nism in the Yukon’s constitutional evolution. Over the
next eight years, the composition of the committee changed
to reflect the growing influence of elected representatives:
as additional elected members were appointed, nonelected
appointees were dropped. Each change was sanctioned by
a directive from the minister to the commissioner. The
1970 letter of instruction also required the commissioner
to give “advice of Committee and especially elected mem-
bers fullest possible consideration in determining the course
of action to be followed by you in any given situation”
(Chretien, 1970). Thus, the commissioner was to be guided
by the advice of the committee, but was not required to
follow it (Elliott, 1978). This was an irritant to the elected
members, who by 1978 constituted a majority on the
committee; they felt that it was undemocratic, colonial and
anachronistic to have an appointed commissioner involved
in policy-making. The situation in the Yukon was very
different from that in the provinces, where the lieutenant
governors had no role in policy-making and acted only on
instructions from cabinet.
At the federal level, the Progressive Conservative and
Liberal party leaders had quite different responses to
Yukon’s demands for rapid constitutional change. The
Yukon’s Member of Parliament, Erik Nielsen, a long-time
advocate of provincial status for the Yukon, gained the
support of Opposition leader Joe Clark for offering provin-
cial status to the territory. Canada’s Liberal prime minis-
ter, Pierre Trudeau, supported slower change, but
discounted the possibility of provincial status “in my
lifetime” (Whitehorse Star, July 12, 1976:1).
The territorial election of 20 November 1978 was the
first to be contested by the territorial New Democratic,
Liberal, and Progressive Conservative parties. The elec-
tion was won by the Yukon Territorial Progressive Con-
servative Party, and the Yukon had, for the first time, a
party-based government with a government leader equiva-
lent to the premier in a province. This new political
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leadership soon demanded “full responsible government”:
that is, a fully elected executive committee responsible for
all aspects of the administration of the Yukon Govern-
ment. Minister Hugh Faulkner was sympathetic, and the
appointment of a new commissioner, Ione Christensen,
provided an opportunity to honour promises to grant addi-
tional responsibility to the elected members of the com-
mittee. Mrs. Christensen was the first lifelong resident of
the Yukon to be appointed to this position.
The Faulkner Letter
Mrs. Christensen was initially invited to consider the
appointment in August 1978, and was directly involved
with senior Department of Indian Affairs and Northern
Development (DIAND) officials in negotiating and draft-
ing her initial letter of instruction, which set out the terms
of reference for her position. She asked Minister Hugh
Faulkner to review the proposed terms of reference with
the new government leader, C.W. Pearson, and with the
chairman of the Council for Yukon Indians, Harry Allen,
before finalizing them. Faulkner acceded to the request,
and Commissioner Christensen subsequently consented to
her appointment (I. Christensen, pers. comm. 1998). This
was the first time that territorial and aboriginal leaders had
been consulted on the commissioner’s instructions.
The minister’s letter of instruction of 25 January 1979
stated that the responsibilities of the commissioner were to
be divided into three categories: (1) areas where she was to
be bound by the advice of the executive committee; (2)
areas of federal and territorial interest that could be moved
into Category 1; and (3) areas that would remain subject to
federal direction. Category 1 matters included the prepara-
tion and introduction of bills and the administration of all
ordinances passed by the commissioner in council except
those included in categories 2 and 3. Category 2 matters
included the following:
all Bills, Ordinances, policy decisions and administra-
tive measures within the jurisdiction of the Commis-
sioner under the Yukon Act as they affect the on-going
federal interest with respect to: 1. The rights and spe-
cial interests of the Indian people of the Yukon... 2.
Finance... 3. Territorial legislation administered by the
Federal Government... 4. Responsibilities of the Com-
missioner for the general administration of the govern-
ment. (Faulkner, 1979)
Category 3 items included all matters affecting the
Yukon constitution: “These are principally the powers of
the Commissioner and the Council, areas of territorial
legislative jurisdiction and the relationship of the Territo-
rial Government with departments and agencies of the
Government of Canada” (Faulkner, 1979).
The letter outlined a further major change: the commis-
sioner was to be bound by the advice of the government
leader with respect to the names and number of elected
members on the executive committee, instead of relying
on nominations coming from the Yukon Council as a
whole (Faulkner, 1979). This brought the Yukon’s proce-
dures into line with those of the provinces in determining
the composition of the cabinet.
Faulkner’s letter was important because it required the
commissioner, for the first time, to accept the advice of the
executive committee on some matters. Prior to this in-
struction, the commissioner was only required to give that
advice “fullest possible consideration.” However, the
Faulkner letter did not come close to addressing the range
or the magnitude of change sought by the Yukon Progres-
sive Conservative Party’s leadership, and relations be-
tween the new commissioner and the Conservative
leadership were strained. Government Leader Pearson did
not feel that it was appropriate for the commissioner to be
involved in executive committee decision making, so the
elected members of the committee met prior to full execu-
tive committee meetings to establish positions on policy
issues and would refuse to accept any suggestions from the
commissioner in full committee. Consequently, Mrs.
Christensen had to either accept their decisions or veto
them, and the latter course was not a palatable alternative:
it would provide a platform for the government leader to
challenge the legitimacy of having the commissioner on
the committee and inflame federal-territorial relations
(I. Christensen, pers. comm. 1998). The commissioner and
deputy commissioner also held portfolio responsibilities
in important areas (Finance, Public Service Commission,
Executive Committee Office, Government Services, Inter-
governmental Affairs, Liquor Corporation, and Workers’
Compensation Board), and Mrs. Christensen felt that she
could, and should, have a role in cabinet.
The Political Situation
Relations with the Council for Yukon Indians (CYI)
were also strained early on. Commissioner Christensen
supported a move to have the Yukon Government partici-
pate in land-claim negotiations as an independent third
party, rather than as part of the federal negotiating team.
When presented with a memorandum of understanding to
give effect to this change in February 1979, she was
strongly lobbied by CYI Chair Harry Allen not to sign
(I. Christensen, pers. comm. 1998).
The federal election of May 1979 brought in the
short-lived Progressive Conservative government of Joe
Clark, and Jake Epp was appointed Minister of Indian and
Northern Affairs. Shortly after the new minister’s appoint-
ment on 4 June 1979, Yukon Government Leader Pearson
presented the new minister with a letter outlining his
government’s position on obtaining a greater measure of
responsible government for the territory. In his letter of 18
June 1979, Pearson specifically requested that the com-
missioner be removed from the executive committee and
that the committee be renamed executive council, as was
the practice in the provinces:
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it is our contention that the Commissioner need not and
should not continue to play a predominant role in the
day to day administration of the Yukon Government.
The Commissioner’s current portfolio of responsibili-
ties should be transferred to elected members of the
Executive Council. If these transfers were made, there
would be little need for the Commissioner to chair or
attend meetings of the Executive Council. In our view,
the Commissioner should be directed to follow the
same constitutional practices...as are followed in com-
parable situations by the Lieutenant-Governor of a
province. (Pearson, 1979)
The letter also noted that Pearson had prepared draft
terms of reference for the commissioner, as well as some
suggested amendments to the Yukon Act for the minister’s
consideration. Pearson went on to suggest that “the estab-
lishment of a wholly elected Executive Council would also
mean that the position of Deputy Commissioner would no
longer be required. The Judge of the Supreme Court of the
Yukon Territory could be appointed as Administrator
pursuant to the Yukon Act during the Minister’s absence,
illness or other inability or when the office of Commis-
sioner is vacant” (Pearson, 1979). The minister concurred
with Mr. Pearson’s views completely; however, he did not
discuss Pearson’s letter with Commissioner Christensen
before issuing his letter of instruction to her. Instead, Mrs.
Christensen was asked to review a draft position paper,
dated 13 August 1979, on “Full Responsible Govern-
ment.” The paper, prepared by the Territorial Affairs
Division of DIAND, proposed major and rapid changes,
including removal of the commissioner from the executive
committee and of her office from the territorial govern-
ment building and new funding arrangements for the
Yukon Government. Mrs. Christensen wrote to Minister
Epp on 24 August 1979 to state that, while she did not
oppose the changes categorically, she did feel that they
would be implemented far too quickly for the fledgling
Yukon Progressive Conservative Party government to
absorb. She also felt they could jeopardize land-claim
negotiations (I. Christensen, pers. comm. 1998). Her view
conflicted with the aspirations of the Yukon Govern-
ment’s leaders, who were advocating rapid change.
Pearson’s proposals for change were revealed to the public
by Opposition Leader Iain MacKay at a press conference on
18 July 1979. And in September, Commissioner Christensen
publicly announced that she might resign if her role in
government were substantially reduced (Smyth, 1991).
THE EPP LETTER
In his 9 October 1979 letter to Commissioner
Christensen, Minister Epp instructed her to:
request the Territorial Government Leader that he shall
constitute and appoint a body known as the Cabinet or
the Executive Council which will have as its members
those elected representatives of the Territorial Council
who are designated from time to time by the Govern-
ment Leader who enjoys the confidence of the Council.
On the advice of the Government Leader you shall
assign Department executive responsibilities to the
appropriate members of the Executive Council.
He went on to instruct her to remove herself from the
policy-making process: “You will not be a member of the
Cabinet or the Executive Council, and will not participate
on a day-to-day basis in the affairs of the Cabinet or the
Executive Council, and Council of the Yukon in those
matters delegated in the Yukon Act to the Commissioner
in Council” (Epp, 1979). He also stated: “I hereby instruct
you to accept the advice of the Council in all matters in the
said [Yukon] Act which are delegated to the Commis-
sioner in Council, provided that those matters meet the
requirements of Section 17 of the said Act and excepting
Section 46 of the said Act” (Epp, 1979). (Section 17 stated
that the powers to legislate could not exceed those granted
to provinces, while Section 46 specified that all lands in
the Yukon remain vested in Her Majesty in right of Canada.)
Thus the commissioner was required to take on the role of
a de facto lieutenant governor for the Yukon: she would no
longer hold a portfolio of ministerial responsibilities or be
a member of cabinet, and would accept the advice of the
government leader on all policy and legislative matters.
Other consequences of the Epp letter were the dismissal of
the deputy commissioner, Douglas Bell (although he stayed
on as the Yukon’s administrator) and the authorization for
the government leader to refer to himself as “Premier” and
to his cabinet members as “Ministers” if they so wished.
Cabinet documents such as “Commissioner’s Orders” be-
came “Orders-In-Council” and “Records of Recommen-
dation” were renamed “Records of Decision,” to reflect
the fact that the cabinet had replaced the commissioner as
the ultimate decision-making authority in the territory.
The changes effected by the Epp Letter brought the
Yukon suddenly into line with the practices and proce-
dures familiar to most Canadians from provincial govern-
ments: elected representatives of the people of the territory
could now be held fully accountable for the policies,
priorities, and expenditures of the Yukon government.
There were no longer any federal appointees involved in
executive decision making or holding portfolio responsi-
bilities in the Yukon government.
REVOLUTION OR EVOLUTION?
Events on 9 October 1979 unfolded rapidly and dra-
matically. At about 9:30 a.m., Indian and Northern Affairs
Minister Jake Epp held a telephone press conference
with local reporters to discuss the contents of his letter.
He confirmed his intention to amend the Yukon Act after
meeting with elected representatives of the Yukon
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Government and Council for Yukon Indians to discuss
constitutional change (Senger, 1981). Epp also reiterated
the prime minister’s election promise that Yukon residents
would be given an opportunity to vote on provincial status
in a referendum to be held during the government’s first
four years in office:
What we intend to do, as I indicated again: the prime
minister indicated during the election campaign, was to
establish responsible government whereby all people
of Yukon could participate. Once that had been done,
then the decision could be taken on whether or not a
provincial status was in the best interest of Yukoners
and I have indicated very clearly that that will be done
by referendum, by the citizens of Yukon. (Senger, 1981)
Mrs. Christensen, having reviewed her new terms of
reference, quickly decided that she was not prepared to be
a quasi lieutenant governor. She phoned the minister’s
office that afternoon to tender her resignation: “I phoned
the Minister at about 2:45, or the Minister phoned me...he
returned my call...and I told him at that time that with deep
regrets I felt I would have to tender my resignation
immediately...that the terms of reference were not the
terms of reference that I could work with” (Senger, 1981).
This decision was also communicated to Government
Leader Chris Pearson, who was speaking in the Second
Session of the 24th Legislature. He interrupted his speech
to announce:
Now, Mr. Speaker, I have an announcement to make
which I regret very much. In a letter to the Minister of
Indian Affairs and Northern Development, on June
18th, 1979, and in subsequent meetings with the Min-
ister, the Government of Yukon outlined some positive
measures to further the evolution of responsible gov-
ernment in Yukon.
Although I am pleased to report that the Minister has
responded favourably to our requests, it is with consid-
erable regret that my colleagues and I have learned of
Commissioner Christensen’s intention to resign. I would
like to stress that we have the greatest regard for
Commissioner Christensen and would have liked very
much to have had her continue as the functions of the
office are changed.
Mrs. Christensen has performed her duties as Com-
missioner with diligence and dignity. Her decision to
resign is most unfortunate in view of the vital role she
has already played in contributing to the development
and success of responsible government in Yukon. (Gov-
ernment of Yukon, Hansard, 9 October 1979:337)
Mrs. Christensen held a press conference at 4:00 p.m. to
elaborate on her reasons for resigning. In her words:
In using the terms of reference I see really two very
distinct roles: two roles that I feel are not compatible or
can[not] be played by only one person. I see the role of
Lieutenant-Governor, although it is not spelled out as
Lieutenant-Governor, but quite obviously that is the
role....and I see the other role...and that is the role I do
not feel has been addressed or clarified...the terms of
reference state what the commissioner will not do. I do
not think they spell out what the commissioner shall do
...that has been alluded to, but it has not been spelled
out and I think it should have been spelled out more
clearly. (Senger, 1981)
In the Yukon Legislative Assembly, Opposition Leader
Iain MacKay spearheaded questions about the govern-
ment’s agenda in pushing for constitutional change. He
viewed the Epp letter as making the Yukon a de facto
province:
That search for power has been a Holy Grail for succes-
sive Executive Committees, the goal being, ultimately,
provincial status. Well, if that is the goal, I think I
should congratulate the Members opposite, because I
think that, in fact, you have achieved de facto provin-
cial status with that letter today. (Government of Yu-
kon, Hansard, 9 October 1979:344)
MacKay went on to decry the changes on the basis that
they had not been adequately considered or opened to
public discussion:
I will say that the essential preconditions to provincial
status should have been a study of the costs of this
move, who is paying the bills now, who will do it next
year and the year after that. There should have been
open and public negotiations with the Federal Govern-
ment on these things. There should have been a settle-
ment of Indian Land Claims. There should have been a
study of the institutions and manpower and talent
requirements of a province.
There should have been a clear question in a refer-
endum. None of this happened. Instead, I think, I have
not heard her reasons yet, but we have heard of the
resignation of the Commissioner. She has stated
publically before today that such an event could
occur. (Government of Yukon, Hansard, 9 October
1979:345)
On 15 October, the executive of the Council for Yukon
Indians re-entered the debate by flying to Ottawa to de-
mand that constitutional issues be included in the land
claims forum. This resulted in a further meeting on 25
October involving Yukon government, Council for Yukon
Indians representatives, and the minister of Indian and
Northern Affairs. By 21 November, Yukon government
officials were able to confirm that they concurred with this
approach (Smyth, 1991:63).
In the interim, the debate continued in the media and the
Yukon Legislative Assembly. On 17 October, the local
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Canadian Broadcasting Corporation station sponsored a
radio debate on Yukon constitutional development enti-
tled “Too Far, Too Fast?” In the Legislative Assembly, the
New Democratic Party member, Tony Penikett, brought
forward Motion Number 30, which proposed the creation
of a special committee on constitutional development to
hear from the public and discuss Yukon’s constitutional
development (Government of Yukon, Hansard, 17 Octo-
ber 1979:541 – 542).
The motion was supported by both the government and
opposition parties, and thus provided some measure of
resolution to the debate. However, the Committee’s work
was eclipsed by the defeat of the Clark government and the
calling of a federal election for 18 February 1980.
Former Commissioner Christensen contested the riding
for the Liberal Party and was only narrowly defeated by
incumbent, Erik Nielsen. Nonetheless, the Liberals were
granted a majority government, and the new minister, John
Munro, announced on 29 October 1980 that there would be
no further changes to the Commissioner’s letter of instruc-
tions (Smyth, 1991).
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE LETTER
The significance of the Epp letter to the Yukon’s consti-
tutional development has been a matter of some debate. At
one extreme would be Erik Nielsen’s perspective that it
was merely a “sop” to the Yukon political leadership and
carries no significance because the changes were never
enshrined in federal legislation. Nielsen does not even
mention the Epp letter in his autobiography, The House is
Not a Home (Nielsen, 1989), and in a public forum held in
Whitehorse on 20 July 1995, he stated:
Suffice it to say, that the Epp letter is just that—and
nothing more—in my opinion....In my opinion the Epp
letter was a sop. The Epp letter was the degree to which
the bureaucracy was prepared to meet the rising tide of
frustration and resentment in the Yukon with respect to
the lack of any representation at the grass roots. It was
not enough for me. I wanted to go much further....There
is no legislative force to the Epp letter. (Nielsen, 1995)
Nielsen is certainly correct that ministerial letters of
instruction can be much more easily amended or revoked
than amendments to federal legislation. The federal gov-
ernment has been reluctant to address amendments to the
Yukon Act, except on issues of significance to the federal
government. The time and effort required to get items onto
the government’s legislative agenda are significant, while
instructions to commissioners are relatively easy to effect
and can presumably be accomplished without even taking
the matter to cabinet. Nielsen’s disappointment can per-
haps be attributed in large measure to the fact that the
Conservative government did not have sufficient time
before it was defeated to amend the Yukon Act, which
would have given the Epp letter the permanence he sought.
However, it is understating the importance of letters of
instruction to suggest that they have no legislative force:
they at least have status as subordinate legislation. And the
fact that the Epp letter has only been elaborated upon, and
never revoked, gives some credence to the argument that
it now has a measure of permanence, perhaps even the
recognition of being a convention.
Yukon historian Brent Slobodin argues that the changes
formalized in the Epp letter are politically irreversible.
According to this perspective, it would not be possible to
change the commissioner’s terms of reference to return
the commissioner to a decision-making role on the
executive:
Nielsen is quite wrong in saying that it could all be
taken away by the federal minister. Given the evolu-
tionary growth away from Britain of Canada itself, the
precedents are such that the Supreme Court would not
support it. I can only see Ottawa doing such a thing if
the territory became broke and found itself unable to
generate sufficient revenue. (B. Slobodin, pers. comm.
1998)
The strength of this argument may well be that political
executives in Canada need not have a legislative or consti-
tutional basis in statutes: they exist because elected mem-
bers of political parties recognize the authority of their
leaders to appoint cabinets and organize the operations of
government. The governor general and lieutenant gover-
nors, while holding formal executive authority in law, are
powerless except in exceptional circumstances. Conse-
quently, any attempt to return the commissioner to cabinet
by amending the letter of instruction would be viewed as
fundamentally undemocratic, and thus illegitimate, by the
people of the Yukon and Canadians generally.
Kirk Cameron and Graham White, authors of Northern
Governments in Transition, appear to side with Nielsen in
this debate. They suggest that the Epp letter may represent
little more than political opportunism:
The Epp letter has been criticized as a master stroke of
political opportunism, the main purpose of which was
to promote the Progressive Conservatives as the party
of economic and political progress in the North. Since
responsible government, according to this view, had
effectively been achieved under the Liberals, the Epp
letter was essentially a public relations exercise rather
than a genuine constitutional advance. The accuracy of
this interpretation is a matter for debate; what is not at
issue is that the Epp letter, by formally recognizing the
establishment of responsible government, signifies the
culmination of the changes occurring during the previ-
ous decade. (Cameron and White, 1995:23)
Furthermore, Cameron and White (1995) suggest that
while the territories have developed a unique constitutional
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status because of land-claim agreements and certain court
decisions, they might still be subject to ministerial fiat:
the Territories remain vulnerable to external actions
that could affect their ability to determine their evolu-
tion. Their territorial constitutions...leave the federal
minister responsible for the North with substantial
power to modify the relationship between the Commis-
sioner, the executive and the assembly.
If...conventions are clearly developing in the terri-
tories, as yet no test—political or legal—has confirmed
the inviolability of the current government structure or
whether the federal minister is restricted in exercising
control over the commissioners. (p. 122 – 123).
Consequently, they argue that the territories’ constitu-
tional progress to date needs to be protected through amend-
ments to the territorial constitutions and to the Constitution of
Canada (Cameron and White, 1995). Nielsen would concur.
Cameron and Gomme (1991) also note the argument
made by Professor Cheffins that conventions are easily
dispensed with by written law:
Conventions, the Court stated, are not enforced by the
Courts; where there is explicit legislation granting
authority, that legislation can be amended whenever
deemed appropriate by the government which passed
it; and therefore, given the status of the Yukon Act as a
piece of federal legislation, Parliament may amend that
statute as and when it sees fit. (Cameron and Gomme,
1991:7)
 Cameron and White’s perspective is supported and
well stated by the federal government’s most recent, al-
though now dated, policy statement on northern develop-
ment, A Northern Political and Economic Framework:
The acts say nothing of an executive council whose advice
must be taken and suggests [sic] a comprehensive capac-
ity for ministerial control. Instructions from the minister
to the commissioners and nothing more enduring set out
the system of administering the powers of the territorial
governments. Furthermore, all territorial legislation is
automatically subject to federal legislation and the pow-
ers of reservation and disallowance. While it has been
suggested the territories already have responsible govern-
ment by virtue of customary usage and convention, the
fact remains that the federal government is ultimately
responsible in law for the action of the territorial execu-
tive. More specifically, while the powers of reservation
and disallowance have not been imposed, there are never-
theless robust prerogatives which could be exercised by
the minister and the governor-in-council at any time.
(Government of Canada, 1988:7)
Gurston Dacks’ perspective on the Epp letter was that
its impact was more than symbolic. He viewed the letter’s
role as crucial in transferring accountability for budgetary
matters to elected representatives:
In October 1979, Mr. Faulkner’s Conservative succes-
sor, Jake Epp, went substantially farther by transfer-
ring ultimate executive responsibility from the
Commissioner to the Territorial Legislative Assembly
acting through what was now called its Executive
Council. The Commissioner was no longer to sit on the
Executive Council, whose members were not only
individually responsible for their departments but also
collectively [responsible] for the territorial budget.
This was a crucial grant of power, given that the budget
is the basic device used by governments to determine
their priorities. (Dacks, 1981:91 – 92)
While this latter perspective is persuasive, it does not
address the issue of the permanence of the change effected.
The fundamental issues, the constitutional status of the
Yukon and the federal government’s role in governing the
territory, remain unresolved.
The Yukon’s Constitutional Status
The use of letters of instruction and the question of their
permanence raise the issue of the Yukon’s subordinate
status in Confederation. Other examples of the Yukon’s
subordinate status, as compared with provinces, include
the reservation of assent to the executive council bill by the
Yukon’s Administrator, upon the instructions of the min-
ister, in 1982; the transfer of land in the Yukon to the
ownership of the Tetlit Gwitch’in people of the Northwest
Territories (over the objections of the Yukon government)
in 1992; and the amendments to the Constitution Act
(1982) that imposed paragraphs 42(1) (e) and (f) on the
territorial governments. These amendments authorized
the federal government, with the consent of seven prov-
inces, to amend territorial boundaries or grant provincial
status. Prior to 1982, the federal government alone could
have granted provincial status. Thus, the people of the
territories continue to live with constitutional uncertainty
that other Canadians do not face. The federal government,
with the collusion of seven provinces, has the ability to
amend the Yukon’s constitutional arrangements without
the consent of the Yukon’s people. It can unilaterally veto
territorial legislation by ministerial directive. Further-
more, under the current constitutional amending formula
(42 (1) (e) and (f) of the Constitution Act), it can thwart
attempts to attain provincial status (even if seven prov-
inces approved provincial status, the federal government
could veto it by not proceeding with a resolution in Parlia-
ment) and alter territorial boundaries without the consent
of Yukon residents. These are not actions that most Cana-
dians would accept as legitimate today. Consequently, the
constitutional status of the territories remains an issue
which should concern Canadians, given our expectation
that all Canadians have equality under the law.
78 •  S. SMYTH
CONCLUSION
This paper is about the constitutional development of
the Yukon Territory and the importance of the Epp letter
to that development. The Epp letter was an important
document because it brought about a fundamental change
to the executive of the Yukon government: the federally
appointed commissioner was instructed to let elected rep-
resentatives take full responsibility for all budgetary and
policy issues in the Yukon. This was the final stage in a
nine-year process that gradually reduced the influence of
federally appointed officials on the policy making of the
Yukon government.
It is possible that the Epp letter was unnecessary:
elected representatives might have displaced the commis-
sioner from cabinet by meeting on their own, making their
own decisions, and launching their own initiatives in the
legislative assembly, without ever consulting the commis-
sioner. This was the course they were on before the issu-
ance of the Epp letter. It would have been a difficult fight,
however: as long as the commissioner and deputy commis-
sioner held portfolio responsibilities for Finance and other
important departments, efforts to circumvent the commis-
sioner might have been stymied. The commissioner’s role
as mediator would certainly have been sorely tested. A
sympathetic federal minister forestalled an open confron-
tation between the elected cabinet ministers and the com-
missioner by instructing the commissioner to leave the
cabinet room altogether. A different government and a
different minister might have reacted differently.
A fundamental question remains: to what extent can the
minister of Indian and Northern Affairs intervene in the
governance of the Yukon by using the power of instruction
granted under the Yukon Act? Could the minister restore
the commissioner to Yukon’s cabinet if the territorial
economy suffered a severe setback and its population
dwindled? What are the limits on the federal prerogative in
the North? And, ultimately, why should northern Canadi-
ans live under a constitutional regime that permits these
powers to be exercised and that differs so much from the
constitutional arrangements of provinces? The resolution
of these questions must come about, as suggested by
Nielsen and by Cameron and White, through legislative
change that places northern Canadians on an equal footing
with all other Canadians. At minimum, the minister’s
prerogative of issuing instructions to the commissioner
should be repealed. A provincial government would not
accept a federal minister’s meddling in the affairs of its
executive, and constitutional conventions now provide
sufficient direction to commissioners in their conduct of
public affairs. Indeed, the most recent directive from
DIAND Minister Jane Stewart (Stewart, 1997) to Com-
missioner Judy Gingell instructed her as follows:
There have been instances in Yukon’s history when
former Commissioners have had to exercise discretion
in respect to elections. In such situations, you are to
follow conventions and traditions as they have emerged
in Canada relative to the offices of the Governor Gen-
eral and provincial Lieutenant Governors.
With regard to situations where you are called upon
to sign documents on behalf of the Government of the
Yukon, in all matters where the Yukon Legislative
Assembly and the Yukon Government have responsi-
bility, you will accept the recommendations of your
first minister. (Stewart, 1997)
If federal intentions to foster constitutional develop-
ment in the North are to be credible, actions to demonstrate
those intentions will speak louder than words. In the
Yukon, this will mean replacing directives with conven-
tions and changing legislation to support constitutional
development.
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